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Abstract
The present note shows the interaction between technological dif-
ferences between countries and the level of trade costs as a deter-
minant of trade patterns. It takes the work of Kikuchi et al.(2008)'s
Chamberlinian-Ricardian model as its point of departure, and extends
the analysis to include both a continuum of industries, as did Dorn-
busch et al. (1977), and iceberg transport costs. It will be shown that
trade liberalization drastically changes the nature of trade patterns,
particularly the emergence of intra-industry trade.
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1 Introduction
Over the last several decades a vast literature has developed on the emer-
gence of intra-industry trade (i.e., two-way trade of dierentiated products).
Among several competing models of intra-industry trade, Chamberlinian mo-
nopolistic competition models of trade have been extensively investigated
since the groundbreaking work of Krugman (1979). Helpman's (1981) inu-
ential work on the integration of the monopolistic competition trade model
into a neoclassical framework, which has been extended and made popular
by Helpman and Krugman (1985), has led to the widely held belief that neo-
classical and new trade theories are complementary in nature.1 Those models
are very successful in explaining the emergence of intra-industry trade.
To focus on the role of increasing returns and imperfect competition,
a standard one-factor model assumes cross-country technical homogeneity:
each rm in the monopolistically competitive sector incurs an identical xed
cost and a constant marginal cost. As a result, there has been little inves-
tigation into the role of technical heterogeneity among countries. However,
the Ricardian comparative advantage, which plays a basic role in the tradi-
tional international-trade context, is worthy of more attention. To address
this point, Kikuchi et al. (2008) explored cross-country technical hetero-
1See Wong (1995) for the comprehensive surveys of the relevant literature.
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geneity in both xed costs and marginal costs as a determinant of trade pat-
terns. Within a two-country, many-industry framework, they showed that
the extent of cross-country technical dierences among industries plays an
important role as a determinant of trade within each industry. However, they
assumed away any trade costs between countries.
The present note takes the work of Kikuchi et al. (2008) as its point of
departure, and extends the analysis to include both a continuum of indus-
tries, as did Dornbusch et al. (1977), and iceberg transport costs. In each
industry, xed costs can dier between countries. It will be shown that the
equilibrium specialization pattern is determined by the interaction between
technical heterogeneity (i.e., the dierences in xed costs) and the level of
iceberg transport costs. It will also be shown that trade liberalization dras-
tically changes the nature of trade patterns, particularly the emergence of
intra-industry trade.
This note is closely related to the research of Venables (1999), which ex-
plored the division of industries between countries in a multi-industry frame-
work with cross-country technical dierences. However, he used a framework
in which there are both transport costs and linkages through intermediate
inputs: his focus was on the interaction between technical dierences and
agglomeration forces via input-output linkages. In contrast, in this note,
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we assume away such aspects (e.g., sources of agglomeration forces such as
input-output linkages) and focus on the interaction between cross-country
technical dierences and trade liberalization.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic setup of
the model of monopolistic competition. Section 3 examines the impact of
trade liberalization.
2 The Model
Suppose there are two countries in the world, Home and Foreign. Each
country is endowed with L units of labor and the only source of income is
the wage, w ( ~w). We assume that there is a continuum of industries on
the unit interval. Industry-specic variables will be indexed by industry
label i (i 2 [0; 1]). Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences and purchase
equal values of the output of all industries. The market structure of each
industry is monopolistically competitive. Each industry is modeled as a
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistically competitive industry, so the quantity
index of industry i takes the form
X i =
0@ niX
k=1
(dik)
( 1)=
+
~niX
~k=1
(di~k)
( 1)=
1A=( 1);  > 1 (1)
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where ni (~ni) is the number of products produced in industry i in Home
(Foreign), dik (d
i
~k
) is the quantity of product k (tildek) in the Home market,
and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between every pair of products.
Trade between countries is costly. We assume that, for every t units shipped,
only one unit arrives. Thus, the price of imported dierentiated product to
the home consumers will be t~p, where ~p is the producer's price for the Foreign
product. The price index of industry i can be obtained as:
P i =
0@ niX
k=1
(pik)
1 
+
~niX
~k=1
(tpi~k)
1 
1A1=(1 ); (2)
where pik (p
i
~k
) is the price of the k (~k) th dierentiated product produced by
industry i in Home (Foreign).
There is cross-country technical heterogeneity: xed costs are assumed
to dier across countries: each Home (Foreign) rm in industry i has i (~i)
units of labor as a xed input. We assume, however, that marginal costs are
the same for all industries and for both countries, being equal to  units of
labor. With the number of rms being very large, the elasticity of demand
for each product becomes . Thus, each product is priced at a markup over
marginal cost:
pik =
w
   1 ; p
i
~k
=
 ~w
   1 :
We chose units so that  = (  1)=, which implies that pi = w. Free entry
ensures that the equilibrium output per product is constant, but dier across
6
countries, and independent of the level of trade costs:
xi = i; ~xi = ~i:
For cross-country dierences in xed costs, we would like to employ the
following specication.2
i = 1 + i; (3)
~i = 2  i: (4)
The production technologies are mirror images of each other. By virtue
of market symmetry, factor prices will be the same in all markets, thus w is
identical across all countries; henceforth we set wL = ~wL = 1. The symmetry
assumptions imply that trade yields a relative wage of one.
Product market equilibrium requires that supply equal demand for each
product. By substituting the zero-prot condition into this equilibrium con-
dition and denoting   t1 yields the following equilibrium condition for a
home product and its foreign counterpart in industry i:
i =

1
ni +  ~ni

+


ni + ~ni

; (5)
~i =


ni +  ~ni

+

1
ni + ~ni

: (6)
2See Yi (2003) and Neary (2003).
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Its solution is
ni =
1
(i   ~i)  

(~i   i) ; (7)
~ni =
1
(~i   i)  

(i   ~i) (8)
If trade cost  is small enough so that
 < min
"
i
~i
;
~i
i
#
(9)
Then all the denominators are positive. The dierence in the number of rms
in i-th industry is
ni   ~ni = (~
i   i)(1 + )2
(i   ~i)(~i   i)
It is positive when ~alpha
i
> i and (7) are satised. The degree of special-
ization will depend on both (a) the level of trade cost t, and (b) the level of
dierence in xed (or comparative advantage).3
3 The Impact of Trade Liberalization
By combining (5), (6) and (7), we can obtain two cutopoints determining
specialzation patterns: i (i=~i = ) and i (~i=i = ).
3Since marginal costs levels dier quite a lot across countries, it is more natural to
include those dierences. In order to make analysis tractable, however, we concentrate on
the technical dierences in xed costs and downplay dierences in marginal costs. This
kind of extension needs further consideration.
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For 0  i  i, only Home will produce those products, whule only Foreign
rms are active for i  i  1. Within the range of i < i < i, both countries
rms are active and intra-industry trade occurs between countries. These
trade patterns are summarized in Figure 1: the vertical axis shows both the
relative xed costs and the freeness of trade (), while the horizontal axis
shows the index of industries. In contrast to the ndings in the previous
literature, we found that intra-industry trade occurs in the middle range of
industries.
[Take in Figure 1]
It is important to note that this result is crucially dependent on the
assumption of the monopolistically competitive industres. If rms in each
industry produce homogeneous products as in Dornbusch et al. (1977), there
are few incentives of intra-industry trade between countries. In our model,
intra-industry trade occurs since each rm produces dierentiated products
and those rms are distributed between countries.
Now we turn to the impact of trade liberalization, which is captured
by a decrease in t (i.e., an increase in ). Reducing trade costs has two
eects. First, trade liberalization intensies import competition: a fall in
t reduces the industry price index due to the extra rms competing for a
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share of a limited domestic market demand ((2)). This leads to a fall in
domestic demand for domestically produced products in each country. The
industry price indices fall more greatly in less competitive industries (i.e.,
industries with relatively higher xed costs) since rms with larger xed
costs are exposed to more import competition compared to rms with lower
xed costs. Second, trade liberalization makes it easier to gain access to the
export market: a fall in t leads to an increase in exports to each country.
The relative strength of the two eects determines equilibrium trade patterns:
the import competition eect dominates since sales in the domestic market
are more signicant than exports in the presence of positive trade costs.4
Firms with relatively higher xed costs nd the gain in exports does not
oset the sales lost in the domestic market so the amount of output they
can sell is insucient to cover (higher) xed costs and this leads to the exit
of some rms in the sectors with comparative disadvantage. The reverse
is true for the rms with relatively lower xed costs, so there is entry in
the sectors with comparative advantage. Summarizing these changes, due
to trade liberalization, Foreign (resp. Home) rms will be wiped out in
the sectors around i (i): the range of sectors with intra-industry trade will
become narrower (see Figure 1).
4See Amiti (1998) for the similar argument in the two-sector setting.
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Proposition: Due to trade liberalization, the range of sectors with intra-
industry trade becomes narrower.
This result cannot be obtained under the assumption that technologies
are identical across both countries. This implies that it is important to extend
the standard model of monopolistic competition to include both technological
heterogeneity and many sectors. The present note must be regarded as very
tentative. Hopefully it provides a useful paradigm for considering how trade
liberalization works as a driving force for industrial reformulation.
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